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SUMMARY
According to the Bayesian view, scientitic hypotheses must be appraised in
terms of their posterior probabilities relative to the available experimental
data. Such posterior probabilities are derived fiom the prior probabilities of
the hypotheses by applying Bayes'theorem. One of the most important
problems arising within the Bayesian approach to scientific methodology is
the choice of prior probabilities. Here this problem is considered in detail
w.r.t. two applications of the Bayesian approach: (1) the theory of inductive
probabilities (TIP) developed by Rudolf Carnap and other epistemologists and
(2) the analysis of the multinomial inferences provided by Bayesian statistics
(BS).
The subjective view and the aprioristic view represent the two 'traditional'
views regarding the choice of prior probabilities. According to the subjective
view such a choice is restricted only by the axioms of the probability
calculus. On the contrary, according to the aprioristic view, the choice is
controlled by further a priori principles of rationality. In this book a critical
analysis of the traditional views is provided and a different view - called the
contexLual view - is proposed (Chapter 7). According to the contextual view
the selection of the optimum prior probabilities is restricted by the cognitive
context of a given empirical inquiry. More precisely, two kinds of contextual
constraints are considered viz. the background knowledge shared by the
scientists engaged in the inquiry and the cognitive goals pursued by these
scientists. In particular, it is assumed that the main cognitive goal of science
is the achievement of a high degree of verisimilitude or approximation to the
truth. This claim - called the verisimilitude thesis - is a basic assumption of
the current epistemological verisimilitude theory (VT) developed by Sir Karl
Popper and others.
The Bayesian approach and VT belong to two difïerent fallibilistic
methodological traditions which originated as a result of the crisis of
infailibilism (Chapter 1.2). According to infallibilism the cognitive goal of
science is certainty regarding the truth of the adopted theories. From antiquity
to the first half of the eighteenth century, infallibilism was the prevailing
methodological view in the philosophy of science. However, from the second
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was indefensible and that more modest 'methodological ideals' were needed.
Hence two different fallibilistic views of scientific knowledge were proposed:
the probabilistic view and the verisimilitude view. The probabilistic view
suggests that in most cases knowledge is merely probable (contrary to the
infallibilistic tenet that certainty is the only epistemic state compatible with
science). On the other hand, the verisimilitude view suggests that science, in
its development, aims to move closer and closer to the truth (contrary to the
infallibilistic tenet that science has to reach the exact truth).
Although the probabilistic view and the verisimilitude view evolved into
two distinct methodological traditions often in competition with each other,
the present inquiry is inspired by the conviction that a 'mature' fallibilistic
methodology can be developed by integrating the two traditions. The
contextual view of prior probabilities proposed in this book can be seen as a
step in this direction since it provides an example of 'co-ordinated
development' of TIP, BS and VT where TIP and BS belong to the tradition
of probabilistic fallibilism and VT belongs to the tradition of verisimilitude
fallibilism.
In inductive inferences the informative content of the conclusions
(hypotheses) is not entirely contained in that of the premises (evidence):
hence one can never be completely sure that hypotheses are true. According
to the Bayesian view of inductive inference the degree of uncertainty of an
individual regarding the hypotheses can be formally represented by
appropriate epistemic probabilities. In particular, BS aims to provide a
systematic analysis of statistical inferences. Furthermore, TIP offers a
Bayesian analysis of certain types of inductive inferences, such as prediction
of future events, which are also typical subjects of study in philosophical
research on induction.
Both BS and TIP can be used to analyze certain inductive inferences -
called multinomial inferences - relative to a multivariate Bernoulli process Ex
whose trials are classit'ied into a set Q formed by ft mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive categories, or properties, Qr,...,Qt.In BS the analysis of
multinomial inferences is made by using certain prior probabilities, or prior
distributions, defined on the possible values of the parameter vector
e=(qr,...,qJ where q denotes the objective probability of obtaining Q, (with
i = 1,...,k) in a trial of Ex. On the other hand, in TIP the analysis of
multinomial inferences is made by using appropriate inductive methods i.e
appropriate predictive probabilities defined on the possible results of certain
sequences of trials of Ex.
In spite of the different strategies used by TIP and BS there is a strict
relationship between these two approaches to multinomial inferences. Indeed
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it can be proved, by using de Finetti 's representation theorem, that any
inductive method belonging to the class of the so-called exchangeable
inductive methods is 'equivalent' to a unique prior distribution on q (Chapter
5.1). In particular the well known inductive methods proposed by Carnap and
Stegmiiller (1959) - herein ref'erred to as GC-systems - are equivalent o the
Dirichlet distributions commonly used in BS (Chapter 6.3).
The problem of choosing the optimum GC-system from a given set of
GC-systems - or, equivalently, the optimum Dirichlet distribution from a
given set of Dirichlet distributions - is the main technical problem considered
in this book (Chapter 8). This problem - which is referred to as the epistemic
problem of optimality (EPO) - can be stated as follows. A GC-system is fully
characterized by a couple (y,),) where y is the so-called prior vector and l, is
a parameter included in the range [0,oo]. Assuming that the prior vector yo has
been selected as the 'optimum' prior vector for an inquiry into a given
multivariate Bernoulli process Ëx, then it may be asked which is the optimum
GC-system (V",i") within the set of all the Gc-systems (y',),) with prior
vector yo or, equivalently, which is the optimum l"-value À"?
The proposed contextual solution of EPO (Chapter 8.3) is based on the
fbliowing two assumptions:
(1) the background knowledge shared by the scientists engaged in the inquiry
into Ex inclucles an 'informal estimate' of the Gini diversity G(q) = 1 - >q;
of -Ex, where Gini diversity is a meÍIsure of the degree of disorder of a
population or process;
(2) the cognitive aim pursued by the scientists is to achieve a high degree oi
verisimilitude or, more precisely, to minimize the distance between their
(y',}")-based estimates of q and the truth (the true value of q).
The prospective audience of this book includes readers interested in: (1) the
theory of inductive probabilities (TIP); (2) the problem of selection of prior
probabilities within Bayesian statistics (BS); and (3) the verisimilitude theory
(VT). More generally, it includes anyone interested in statistics and the
philosophy of science. Given that many of such readers may be relatively
unfamiliar with any of the three above mentioned subjects, the first part of the
book (Chapters 2-4) provides introductory material on TIP, BS and VT.
In the second part (Chapters 5-6) the basic features of GC-systems and
Dirichlet distributions, and the relationships between the two, are illustrated.
Finally, in the third part (Chapters 7-11) the contextual view of prior
probabilities is il lustrated. In particular, in Chapter 7.6 a context-dependent
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justifïcation of the decision to use a prior Dirichlet distribution within a given
inquiry is provided. The above mentioned contextual solution to EPO is
presented in Chapter 8. Another technical result presented in this chapter
(Section 4) is the solution of the so-called logical problem of optimality for
GC-systems. In Chapter 8.7 it is proved that this solution generalizes a
well-known result obtained by Carnap (1952).In Chapter 9 some features of
the contextual view of prior probabilities are elucidated by comparing this
view with other approaches to EPO. In Chapter 10 Gini divenity, which plays
a crucial role in the contextual approach to EPO, is considered in some detail.
Lastly, in Chapter 11, the relationships between the contextual view and some
recent methodological programmes of research are considered and some
possible developments of the contextual view are suggested.
